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Abstract
We propose a notion of an abstract logic. Based on this notion, we define abstract
logic programs to be sets of sentences of an abstract logic. When these abstract logics
possess certain logical properties (some properties considered are compactness, fini-
tariness, and monotone consequence relations ) we show how to develop a fixed-point,
model-state-theoretic and proof theoretic semantics for such programs. The work of
Melvin Fitting on developing a generalized semantics for multivalued logic program-
ming is extended here to arbitrary abstract logics. We present examples to show how
our semantics is robust enough to be applicable to various non-classical logics like tem-
porallogic and multivalued logics, as well as to extensions of classical logic programming
such as disjunctive logic programming. We also show how some aspects of the declara-
tive semantics of distributed logic programming, particularly work of Ramanujam, can
be incorporated into our framework.
1 Introduction
When logic programming was initially introduced by Kowalski, programs were restricted to
be finite sets of definite clauses. The rationale behind this restriction was that a reasonably
simple and fast proof procedure existed for this fragment of classical logic.
While it has been proved that definite clause programs are computationally universal
(cf. Andreka and Nemeti [2] and Blair [7, 8]), definite clauses lack expressive power. Thus,
various researchers were led to investigate the semantics of various syntactic extensions of
definite clause programs. For example, clause bodies may be permitted to contain negated
atoms, clause heads may be allowed to contain disjunctions of atomic formulas, and so on.
A different kind of extension to classical definite clause logic programming occurs when
we allow logic programs to be sets of formulas in some non-classical logic. Such a formalism
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has been found to be useful for incorporating quantitative deduction into logic program-
ming. Similarly, various non-classical logic programming languages have been introduced
for reasoning in the presence of temporal and modal phenomena, for reasoning with incon-
sistency, reasoning about beliefs, etc.
In those cases where the semantics of such extensions has been studied, it has been
found that these different extensions are semantically similar.
In this paper, we will consider an abstract logic to be an appropriately defined mathe-
matical structure. Programs will then turn out to be sets of objects in this structure. We
will then demonstrate how to associate with each program, an operator that maps sets of
formulas (which will be defined relative to the structure) to sets of formulas. Various rela-
tions between the fixed-points of this operator, and properties of the corresponding structure
will be established. A generalized resolution scheme is developed for these abstract logics,
and various soundness and for completeness results are proved.
We will show how various logic programming formalisms existing in the current liter-
ature can be incorporated within our theoretical framework. Examples include: classical
logic programming, temporal logic programming, bilattice based logic programming, para-
consistent logic programming and quantitative logic programming.
2 Abstract Logics
Following a standard convention, given a set ~ of symbols, we use the notation ~+ to denote
the set of non-empty strings generated by this alphabet.
An abstract logic £, consists of:
1. a non-empty set (possibly infinite) LE of symbols
2. an infinite set Lmv of symbols called meta-variables such that (£E n Lmv ) = 0 and
3. a set Lwff. ~ £t of objects called well-formed formulas (or wffs, for short)
4. a set Lmt ~ (£E U Lmv )+ of objects called meta-terms satisfying the following two
conditions:
(a)
and
(b) if V is a meta-variable that occurs in some meta-term T E Lmt, then the string
obtained by replacing V in T by formula F is also a meta-term.
5. a set Lir of syntactic entities, called inference ru.les, of the form
Numerator
To
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where Numerator is a subset of £mt and To is a meta-term. The cardinalioty of
Numerator is called the order of the inference rule, and To is called the denominator
of this inference rule.
Thus, a logic is a 5-tuple [, = (£E, Lw/I' .emv , Lmt, Lir). [, is said to be finitary iff each rule
in Lir has a numerator of finite order. Notice that there is no need for well-formed formulas
of logic [, to look like the familiar syntactic well-formed formulas of classical logic. .cwj/ is
an arbitrary set which we may choose in any way we please. We may choose £wII to be,
say:
1. the set of wffs of classical logic or
2. the set of wffs of modal logic or
3. the set of wffs of auto-epistemic logic or
4. the definite clause fragment of classical logic, etc.
From here on, we assume that [, = (£E, £'wff' Lmv , L,mt, .cir) is some arbitrary, but fixed,
abstract logic.
Definition 2.1 A meta-variable substitution is a function from .emv to £w//. If (1 is a
meta-variable substitution, then we extend (1 to a function (11 of type (.emt ~ Lwff) as
follows:
1. If T E .cwff' then (11(T) = T
2. If T E Lmv , then u'(T) = aCT).
3. Otherwise, a'(T) is the well-formed formula obtained by replacing each meta-variable
V occurring in T by a(V). (Note: Condition 2 in the definition of meta-terms ensures
that O'(T) is a meta-term, and also, of course, that aplication of a meta-variable
substitution to a meta-term eliminates all meta-variables.)
Given a metavariable-substitution u, the extension u' of u is unique, and therefore, we
will often abuse terminology and assume (J' can be applied to meta-terms. Thus, if T is a
meta-term, then we will use the notation aCT) to denote u'(T).
Definition 2.2 If Num¥ator is an inference rule of .c, and a is a metavariable-substitution,
then {/TeFl IF;[;'jmeratoT} is said to be an instance of the above inference rule of £.
If X is a set, we use the notation P(X) to denote the power set of X.
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Definition 2.3 Suppose £, = (£'E,£wJJ,£mv,£mt,£ir) is an abstract logic. For a set
X ~ .cwff of wffs, a derivation from X is a finite or transfinite sequence
such that for each F'N E D, either F"( E D or there is an inference rule in LiT having an
instance of the form um;;ator where N umerator ~ {Ff3 I0 ~ f3 < I}.
The binary relation I- £, between the power set P(.cwff) of .cwff and Lwff is defined by: X t- F
iff F occurs in a derivation from X.
When [, is clear from context, we will abuse notation and simply write I- instead of I-£,.
We will often abuse notation as follows: Given X, y ~ £wJf, we may write X I- Y to denote
that X I- </> for all 4> E Y.
One may wish to think of I- as a syntactic entailment relation. Note however that
there is no restriction limiting proofs to be finitary (or even effective). For logics in which
a property similar to the compactness theorem of classical logic holds, infinitary proofs
are not necessary. OUf aim in allowing infinitary proofs is simply to increase the level of
generality of our framework.
Before we proceed to discuss logic programs written in abstract logics, we present a few
examples of abstract logics.
Example 2.1 Classical logic under the usual rules of inference (cf. Schoenfield [34]) is an
abstract logic.
Example 2.2 Let (£"£,,£wff,£mv,£mt,£ir) be the logic whose well formed formulas are
definite clauses over some pre-determined alphabet of non-logical symbols (cf. Shoenfield
[34]), whose set L mv of meta-variables is {r1 , f 2 , •••}, whose set of meta-terms is (£mv U
£wff) and which has the single inference rule:
Then ([,E, LWff, £mv, £mt, [,ir) is an abstract logic.
Remark 2.1 Let (£E,Lwjj,[,mv,£mt,£ir) be any logic. Then: f- IS monotone, I.e. jf
Xl ~ X 2 ~ Lwf! and Xl ~ F, then X 2 J- F. 0
In general, I- may not be continuous, i.e. there may be a sequence Xl ~ X 2 ~ ••• of
subsets of LwfJ and a formula F such that (Ui Xi) J- F but there is no j such that Xj I- F.
To see this, let [, be any logic that does not possess the well known compactness property
[34].
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3 Abstract Logic Programs
Definition 3.1 An abstract logic program (in logic (£~,£wff,£mv,£mt,£ir)) is a finite
subset of £wff·
Definition 3.2 A theory (in logic (£~,£wff,£mv,.cmt,£ir)) is any subset TH of £wff
satisfying the condition that if X ~ T H and X J- F, then F E T H.
In other words, we view an abstract logic program as the finite set of non-logical axioms of
a theory in an abstract logic.
All the definitions described thus far are fairly general. No restrictions imposed thus far
prevent us from considering logic programs to be arbitrary finite sets of first order formulas.
Or for that matter, nothing said so far prevents us from using full first order modal logic
(say first order S5) as a logic programming language. We will see below why we need to
impose the restriction that abstract logic programs are finite.
Definition 3.3 Suppose P is a set of wffs (w.r.t. logic (£'£,£wJf,£mv,£mt,£ir)). We
associate an operator, denoted Tp, with P. Tp maps the power set, P(£wff) of £wff to
P(£wff) and is defined as follows: F E Tp(X) iff either F E P or Numjlator is an instance
of an inference rule of [, and N umeratoT ~ X.
Suppose we consider the case of classical logic programming without negation ([25]). In
this case, the logic £, is classical logic with the usual rules of inference, and P is always a
finite set of definite clauses. Suppose X = 0. Then Tp(X) turns out to be PUTAUT where
T AUT is the set of tautologies of classical logic. At this point, the only ground atoms in
Tp are those unit ground clauses in P; note that as X = 0, the rule of instantiation was
not applied. However, Tp(Tp(0)) gives us all the ground atoms obtained after the first
application of the classical Tp operator (Lloyd [25]). In effect, our Tp operator simulates
the classical operator in two steps - the first step corresponding to modus ponens, and the
second to instantiation.
Note that Tp is defined when P is any set ofwffs in the abstract logic (£E, £wff, £mv, £mt, £ir).
However, usually, we will assume that P is an abstract logic program, i.e. P is finite.
Proposition 3.1 Suppose P ~ Lwff (in logic £). Then: Tp is monotone. o
Given an abstract logic £, = (£'E,£wff,£mv,£mt,£ir), we will take the set P(£wff) to be
a complete lattice when ordered by set inclusion.
Proposition 3.2 Suppose P is any logic program in a finitary abstract logic £. Then Tp
is continuous and hence J- is continuous. 0
Note that in general, the above theorem does not hold for logic programs over arbitrary
logics. Finitariness is required. Blair and Subrahmanian [11] show that their Tp operator
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for annotated logic programs is not always continuous. The annotated logic which serves
as such a counterexample uses an infinite valued complete lattice T which they construct,
together with, for each subset 7' ~ T, the inference rule
{A : III Jl E T'}
UPETIP
As 7' may be infinite, it is easy to see that such a logic is not finitary.
Definition 3.4 Let (£,,£,L,wjj,L,mv,.cmt,£ir) be an abstract logic and P an abstract logic
program. A set X, p ~ X ~ £wj j is said to be a P-model-state of (£I;, Lw ! f, .emu, Lmt, .ciT)
iff for every instance Num(Jator of an inference rule R E Lir such that N umerator ~ X
GEX.
Proposition 3.3 Suppose P is an abstract logic program. X is a P-model-state of the
abstract logic (£E, {,wff, {,mv,{,mt, {,ir) iffTp(X) ~ X. 0
The above theorem establishes a one to one correspondence between P-model-states and
the pre-fixed-points of the Tp operator.
Definition 3.5 Suppose (£I;, .cwff' Lmv ,£mt, LiT) is an abstract logic, P is a logic program
(w.r.t. (LE, Lwff, Lmv,Lmt, LiT))' and X ~ Lwff. X is said to be P-supportediffwhenever
F EX, then either F E P or there is an inference rule R E Lir having an instance of the
form NumjJator such that Numerator ~ X.
Proposition 3.4 Suppose (LE, Lwjj,Lmv , Lmt,£ir) is an abstract logic, and P is an ab-
stract logic program and X ~ L w!!. X is P-supported iffTp(X) ~ X.
Proof. X is P-snpported
iff (YF E £wff) if F E X then either F E P or there is an inference rule in L having an
instance of the form NumjJator such that N umerator ~ X
iff (\:IF E Lwjj) if F E X then F E Tp(X)
iff X ~ Tp(X). o
Theorem 3.1 Suppose (LE, LwfJ, L mv , Lmt, Lir) is an abstract logic, and P is an abstract
logic program and X ~ Lwff. X is a P-supported model-state of (L,,£, Lwff, £mv, £mt, Lir)
iffTp(X) = X. 0
Theorem 3.1 is an immediate consequence of Proposition 3.3 and 3.4. It establishes
a one-one correspondence between the fixed-points of the Tp operator and the supported
model-states of the program P. Given a logic {, = (.c,,£, .cw!f, L mv , Lmt, .ciT)' and an ab-
stract logic program P in £, we now define the iterations of the Tp operator.
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Definition 3.6 (Transfinite Iteration of Tp operator) Let Abe an ordinal. Define:
Tp i 0 = 0
Tp i A= U,,<,\ Tp(Tp i ,)
Tp! 0 = .cwjJ
Tp ! A= ~<,\ Tp(Tp ! ,)
Proposition 3.5 Suppose .c (.cE,£'wjj,.cmv,£mt,.cir) is an abstract logic. Further-
more, suppose P is a logic program (in logic.c = (.cE,.cwjj,.cmv,£mt,£ir)). Then: P r- F
iff F E Ijp(Tp). (ljp(Tp) denotes the least fixed-point of the operator Tp).
Proof. We proceed in two parts.
I. Suppose P r- F. Then there is a sequence Fo, F l , F2 , •• • , Fo where a is some ordinal such
that Fo = F and this sequence satisfies the conditions of Definition 2.3. We proceed by
transfinite induction on u. We show that F E lfp(Tp).
Base Case. (a =0) Trivial.
Inductive Case. Let r = {F--y I, < a}. Then, by the induction hypothesis, r ~ Ijp(Tp).
By Definition 2.3, there is an inference rule of £, having an instance of the form
Numerator
Fa
such Numerator ~ r ~ Ijp(Tp). Hence, by definition ofTp, FE Tp(ljp(Tp)) = Ijp(Tp).
Thus we have shown that if P r- F, then F E Ijp(Tp).
II. We now show the reverse implication, i.e if F E Ifp(Tp), then P r- F. As Tp is
monotone, and as P(£wff) is a complete lattice under inclusion, it is easy to see that Tp
has a least fixed point and that this fixed-point is identical to Tp t , for some ordinal,.
We proceed by induction on ,.
Base Case. (1' == 0) Trivial.
Inductive Case. Suppose F E Tp i ,. There are two possibilities:
If , is a limit ordinal, then F E U,p<--y Tp i 'tj; and therefore, there is some ordinal 4> < ,
such that F E Tp i 4>. Therefore, by the induction hypothesis, P ~ F.
IT 1 is a successor ordinal, i.e. 1 = (6 +1) for some ordinal 6, then there is an inference rule
of [, having an instance of the form
Numerator
F
where Numerator = {To, ... ,T" . ..} such that P ~ Ti for all Ti E Numerator. Let Ai be
the derivation sequence of Ti from P. Then
AI -· .A( ... F
is a derivation (possibly infinite) of F from P. Hence, P r- F.
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Thus we have shown that if F E lfp(Tp) then P ~ F. This completes the proof. 0
In general, Tp is not necessarily continuous, in particular because .c need not be finitary,
and therefore, 0: may be greater than w.
Definition 3.7 Suppose £, = (£E,£'wff,£'mv,£'mt,£ir) is an abstract logic and let X be a
subset of £wff. X is said to be compact iff whenever X t- F, it is the case that there is a
finite subset X' of X such that X' l- F. (£E,£wjj,£mv,£mt,£ir) is said to be compact iff
each subset X ~ £'wff in (£r.,,£wff,£mv,£mt,£ir) is compact.
Theorem 3.2 Suppose £, = (£I;,£'wff,£m1J,£mt,£ir) is a finitary abstract logic and X
is a subset of [,wff. Then: Tx i w = Ifp(Tx) = {F IX ~ F}. Note here that X is an
arbitrary subset of LWJJ, and hence may not be finite.
Proof. Immediate consequence of Propositions 3.2 and 3.5. o
This theorem makes us ask: "What kinds of logics are finitary? Are most logics likely
to interest us finitary?" Some examples of finitary logics are:
1. classical first order logic
2. most systems of modal logic (e.g. 84,85, and K).
3. most systems of first order temporal logic (e.g. those described in [5, 21])
4. dynamic logic (cf. Harel [23])
5. most systems of many-valued logics possessing a finite set of truth values
The fact that some of the above-mentioned logics have a highly undecidable validity
problem is irrelevant to the finitariness of the logics. Note that finitariness only says that
each inference rule of the logic £, contains a numerator of fini te order. However, the collection
£ir of inference rules may itself be highly undecidable or of very high cardinality. Moreover,
the completeness theorems we will prove in Section 4 relate to the existence of proofs, and
not to whether they can be effectively found.
It is also instructive to give an idea of some logics that are not finitary. One example
is the system of infinite-valued annotated logics due to Subrahmanian [37]. These logics
use an infinitary inference rule that may be summed up as follows: "If A is an atom and
(JLi)iEA are truth values, then from the set of annotated atoms (A : JLi)iEA, conclude A : J.L
where JL = UiEAJLi." Further details of this rule and its logical aspects may be found in [14].
Another well known logic that is not finitary is second order logic.
The results obtained thus far relate to the declarative semantics of logic programming
with different logics. Below, we demonstrate how a few examples of extensions and varia-
tions of the logic programming paradigm (currently existing in the literature) fit into our
framework for programming with abstract logics.
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Example 3.1 (Classical Logic Programming) In order to model classical logic program-
ming as an instance of our scheme, we need to consider only the following rules of inference:
A,B+-A
B
(V'x )F[x]
F[t]
where F[x] denotes a formula F containing zero or more free occurrences of a variable
symbol x, and F[t] denotes the replacement of x in F by a term t.
Example 3.2 (Disjunctive Logic Programming) In this case, for each integer n ~ 0, we
need the following rule of inference:
At V Bt, ... ,An V B n , , C+-Bt&···&Bn
At V··· V An V C
With these rules of inference (this is basically hyper-resolution), together with the instan-
tiation rule for classical logic, it is now possible to model the declarative semantics of
disjunctive logic programming as described by Minker and Rajasekar [29].
Example 3.3 (Multivalued Logic Programming) Consider quantitative logic programs as
defined by Blair and Subrahmaruan [9, 10]. Here, we may use the following rules of inference:
A:.l.
where 1- is the least element of the complete lattice being considered. In addition, for each
subset T' ~ T, we need the rule:
{A : J.l1 Jl E T'}
A : UJJETI Jl
The rule for modus ponens is also necessary:
A,B+-A
B
Example 3.4 (Temporal Logic Programming) We consider the linear time temporal logic
programming language defined by Baudinet [5]. She augments classical logic with two new
operators, 0 (necessity) and 0 (the "next time" operator). Intuitvely, Dp is true at time t
iff p is true at all times t' ~ t. Qp is true at time t iff p is true at time (t +1).
If A is an atomic formula of classical logic, then 0 ... 0 k timesA where k ~ 0 is called a
~
next-atom. An initial program clause is a sentence of the form
where each Ni, 0 ~ i ~ k, is a next-atom. If C is an initial program clause, then DC is
a permanent program clause. A temporal logic program is a finite collection of initial and
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permanent program clauses. It can easily be proved that any temporal logic program is
logically equivalent to a (possibly infinite) set of initial program clauses.
In this setting, the inference rules to be used are:
04>
Qi</>
<P, 1/J~<P
1/J
where the first inference rule is actually a scheme for an infinite set of inference rules
obtained by instantiating i to various different integers. In addition, we need the rule:
Baudinet's [5] proof procedure for temporal logic programming provides an explanation for
why these proof systems are complete.
Example 3.5 (Distributed Logic Programming) If Pt , ... , Pn are pure logic programs, then
the n-tuple P = (Pt, .... ,Pn ) is called a distributed logic program. Each of {l,.~.,n} is
called a site. Program Pi is said to be "the" program at site i. Ramanujam [32] has devel-
oped an elegant model theoretic, fixed-point and proof theoretic semantics for distributed
logic programs of this sort. In our abstract logic framework, wffs may be considered to be
n-tuples (Fl , ... , Fn ) where each Fi is either a clause or a conjunction of ground atoms or
a special dummy symbol #. Thus, if we wish to say that p is true at site 2 and nothing else
is stated about the truth of formulas at other sites, then we assert the wff
(#,p,#, ... ,#).
~
n tuple
For the sake of convenience, suppose n = 2. To say that p and q are both true at site 2 and
r is true at site 1, we have two options. We could assert the single tuple:
(r,p& q)
or we could assert two tuples,
(r,p) , (r, q).
The inference rules for our logic consist of the following:
(MPo) (Ah ... ,Ai-hAi,Ai+l, ,An ), (At, ... ,Ai-h(B +-- Ai),Ai+h .. ·,An)
(At, , Ai-t, B, Ai+l'· .. , An)
Such a rule is in .ciT for each i, 1 ::; i ::; n. Intuitively, this rule says that if some site, say
site j, knows that A is true, and B .- A is a clause in site i, then site i knows that B is
true. In particular, a site cannot know A if there is no clause in that site having A as a
ground instance of its head. In addition, for each pair of integers 1 ::; i,j ::; n, we have a
rule of the form:
(MP1) (Ah ... , Ai-I, Ai, Ai+h · · · , Ai-I, B +-- Ai, Ai+h · · · , An)
At, ... , Ai-t, Ai, Ai+t, ... , Aj-I, B, Aj+t, ... , An)
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This rule captures the intuition that an atom A becomes true at site i iff there is a clause
in Pi having a ground instance of the form
A +- B1 & ... & Bk
such that each Bj is true in some site Pj, 1 :::; j ~ n. (Note that in rille (MPl) Ai is
assumed to be an atom. This assumption is made for the sake of simplicity; stating this
rule when Ai is a conjunction of atoms is straightforward, though notationally cumbersome,
because the different atoms in Ai are allowed to be true at different sites). In addition, for
each 1 ~ i :::; n, we have the rule
(At, ..... , Aj, , An) , (H1 , , Bj, ... , B n )
(At, , (Aj & Bj), , B n )
Repeated application of this rule allows us to derive the following inference rille
(At, ... ,Aj, ... ,An ) , (Bt, ... ,Bj, ... ,Bn )
(At & B t ,.·· ,An & B n)
This formulation is sufficient to capture the declarative semantics for distributed logic pro-
gramming proposed by Ramanujam [32]. The operator associated with programs written
in this abstract logic allows is to capture the exact same fixed-point theory described by
Ramanujam.
One of the crucial aspects of the distributed logic programming formalism of Ramanujam
[32] that we do not capture is synchronization. Ramanujam constructs an elegant proof
theoretic semantics in which synchronization operators are introduced. We do not know
how to mimic this behavior that forms an essential ingredient of his semantics.
We believe that these examples demonstrate that our framework holds some promise of
yielding, in the long run, a unifying treatment of classical and non-classical logic program-
ming semantics.
4 "Proof Theoretic Semantics"
Definition 4.1 Suppose £, = ('c'£,£wff,£mv,£mt,'cir) is an abstract logic, F is a formula,
and G, W ~ £wff. We say formula H is a generalized resolvent of F and G iff there is an
inference rule in £ir having an instance of the form
Numerator
H
such that F E Numerator and Numerator - {F} ~ G. H is also called a unary resolvent
of W if N umerator ~ W.
Given F and G in LwfJ' we denote the set of generalized resolvents of F and G by
~(F,G). Suppose now that ~ is a reflexive ordering on £wfJ. We use the notation ~«F,G)
to denote the minimal elements, if any, of ~(F,G). (Observe that minimal elemerrts may
not exist. Also observe that in general, we may not interchange the arguments of ~.)
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Example 4.1 Suppose we are considering (classical) clausal logic, i.e. LWff is the set of
all clauses (including the empty clause) generated by some alphabet. Then the generalized
resolvent of two clauses is of the form (R V D) where R is the resolvent of the two clauses
we are considering and D is any disjunction (possibly empty). We may assume that £ir
contains the inference rule:
Cl V A V C2 , Dl V -,A V D2
Cl V Dl V C2 V D2
where Cl, C2, Dl' D2 are all scheme variables. IT we assume that clauses are ordered by
the subsumption orderingi (i.e. Cl ~ C2 iff Cl subsumes C2 ), then the minimal clauses are
just the ordinary resolvents (cf. Robinson [33]).
Consider the following two clauses Ct == Dt V At V D2 and C2 == E t ' V -,A2 V E 2
where D l , D 2 , E l and E 2 are all disjunctions (possibly empty). Then in order to appply
the above inference rule, we need to find an instance of Ct and C2 such that A l and A2
yield the same literal (the inference rule above applies only in this case). But this is just
the same as unification. In particular, the above inference rule allows arbitrary unifiers to
be used in resolution, not just mgu's.
Definition 4.2 Suppose X ~ P(£wff), and P is an abstract logic program. A sequence
F t , F2 , ••• ,Fa is called a generalized X -linear input deduction (GLI(X)-deduction, for
short) of F from P iff:
1. F1 E P or F} is the denominator of an instance of a rule R in .Lir such that the
numerator of R is empty, and
2. In the sequel, let a be any ordinal and let A be a limit ordinal.
(a) Fa +1 is a generalized resolvent of Fa and some Y E X where Y ~ {FI , F2 , ••• , Fa}
OR
(b) Fa+1 is a generalized resolvent of Fa and {C} where C E P.
3. If A is a limit ordinal, then FA is a unary resolvent of Y where Y is some subset of
{F,), 17 < A}.
The above definition is called "linear" because of the similarity with linear resolution in
classical theorem proving [26, 27]. Note, in particular, that just as in the case of linear
resolution, one parent in each non-unary resolvent must be the resolvent most recently
derived (i.e. in order to generate Fa+t , by non-unary resolution, Fa must be one of the
parents).
Theorem 4.1 (Soundness) Suppose £ = (£E,.cwf f , £mv, Lmt,£ir} is an abstract logic and
X ~ P(£wff). Then: GLI(X)-deduction is sound w.r.t. £, i.e. if there is a GLI(X)-
deduction of formula F from program P (in the abstract logic .c), then P f- F.
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Proof. Let Fa, Ft , F2 , ••• , Fa be a GLI(X)-deduction of F from P. We proceed by induc-
tion on o.
Base Case. (0 = 0) Then F = Fa = Fa is in P and hence, by Definition 2.3, it follows that
p r- F.
Inductive Case. (a > 1) Let A = {Ft3I,B < a}. By the induction hypothesis, P J- F(3 for all
f3 < o. There are two possibilities:
Case 1 (a is a limit ordinal). Then rule 3 in Definition 4.2 must have been used to obtain
Fa. Hence, there is a rule in Lir having an instance of the form:
Numerator
Fa
such that Numerator C A. By the induction hypothesis, P l- A. As N umerator ~ A,
P l- Numerator. Hence, as P l- A and as Fa is obtained by a unary resolvent of some
Y EX, and as Y ~ A, we know that P r- Y. By definition of r-, it now follows that P r- Fa.
Case 2 (0: is a successor ordinal, i.e. a = (, +1).) In this case, rule (2) in Definition 4.2
must have been used to derive Fa.
rr rule 2(a) of Definition 4.2 was used, then Fa is a generalized resolvent of F'Y and Y for
some Y E X and Y ~ {Ft , ... ,F'Y}. By the induction hypothesis, we know that:
P l- Yand
p r- F'Y.
It follows from Definition 2.3 that P r F,.+1 = Fa.
If rule 2(b) of Definition 4.2 was used, then FOt is a generalized resolvent of Fry and {C} for
some C E P. Thus, P 1- C and, by the induction hypothesis, P 1- F'Y. Thus, P 1- Fa. 0
One would guess, quite correctly, that GLI(X)-deduction is not complete for arbitrary
x. We do not know of a necessary condition on X and/or (£'E,£wff,.cmv,.cmt,.cir) for
GLI(X)-deduction to be complete, but we do know of a sufficient condition which appears
to encompass most existing extensions of logic programming.
Definition 4.3 Suppose (£'L".cwjj,.cmv,£mt,£ir) is an abstract logic and X ~ P(£wJJ).
X is said to possess the ground inclusion property for logic (£~,£wff,.cmv,.cmt,£ir) iff
whenever
Numerator
r
is an instance of an inference rule of £, then Numerator EX.
Intuitively, GLI(X)-deduction allows us to only use those instances of inference rules
whose numerators are in X. Thus, even though an inference rule R may be an instance
of a rule of £ir (and hence may be used in derivations), GLI(X)-deduction may exclude
(or block) the utilisation of rule R in a derivation. Thus, in general, GLI{X)-deduction is
unlikely to be complete. The ground inclusion property, in essence, says that no instance
of an inference rule of Lir may be excluded by X.
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Theorem 4.2 (Completeness) Suppose £, = (£''£,£wJJ,£mv,£mt,£ir) is an abstract logic
and X ~ P(£wff) possesses the ground inclusion property. Then: GLI(X)-deduction is
complete w.r.t. [" i.e. if P I- F, then there is a GLI(X)-deduction of formula F from
program P.
Proof. The proof follows immediately from the fact that X possesses the ground inclusion
property, and hence does not block the use of any inference rule of Lir. 0
Note that the above theorem does not say anything about the length of a GLI-deduction. In
particular, the reader may recollect that GLI-deductions are allowed to be infinitary. The
above completeness theorem does not say anything about the existence of finitary proofs.
Theorem 4.3 (Finitary Completeness) Suppose £, = (£',£,.cwff,£mv,£'mt,£ir) is a finitary
abstract logic. Let X ~ P(£'wff) have the ground inclusion property. Then: finitary GLI-
deduction is complete w.r.t. £', i.e. if P I- F, then there is a finitary GLI-deduction of
formula F from program P.
Proof. The result follows immediately from Theorem 3.2. o
We now revisit the various examples initially described in Section 2 and show how the
proof theory described here is applicable to those systems. This, we hope, will explicate
the utility of our framework in describing logic programming languages that differ from the
traditional definite clause framework in one of two ways:
1. by providing a syntactic variation and/or extension of the definite clause framework
2. by interpreting these programs over various kinds of non-classical logics
We develop below, a couple of examples that show how GLI(X) deduction relates to the
operational semantics of some existing logic programming languages.
Example 4.2 (Classical Logic Programming) Consider the example of classical logic (Ex-
ample 3.1). In classical logic programming, select X to be the set of all clauses expressible
using the non-logical symbols of our logic. Then the application of modus ponens yields the
unrestricted (cf. Lloyd [25]) SLD-resolution proof procedure which allows ancestry resolu-
tion. While this is not quite so powerful as SLD-resolution that forbids ancestry resolution,
this presents an overall view about how resolution systems generalize to non-classical logics.
The fact that ancestry resolution is not required for definite clauses depends crucially upon
the precise syntactic form of the formulas in the definite clause fragment of logic, rather
than on the model theoretic properties of first order logic itself (this observation is backed
by the fact that SLD-resolution is of course not complete for full first order logic). As X is
the set of all clauses in our language, and as any instance of the resolution rule contains only
clauses in the numerator, it follows that no rule is "blocked" by X. Recall that unrestricted
SLD-resolution is same as SLD-resolution except that arbitrary unifiers, rather than only
mgu's, are allowed to participate in the refutation.
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Example 4.3 (Multivalued Logic Programming) Consider multivalued logic programming
over hte complete lattice T of truth values using annotated logics (cf. Blair and Subrahma-
nian [9, 10]). Take X to be the set of all instances of annotated clauses expressible using
the non-logical symbols of our language. We have the following inference rules:
{A : JlI J.l E T /}
A: U~ET' /-L
A:p
A : J.L.
Furthermore, we have th familiar rule of modus ponens. Let us see how this relates to
the procedure of Blair and Subrahmanian [10]. They show that given any annotated logic
program P over T, there is a program C L(P) that can be effectively constructed from P
such that P and CL(P) are not only logically equivalent, but they also have the same Tp
operator. Suppose we now consider only those programs P such that P = CL(P) (such
programs are said to be closed, and by the previous sentence, it follows that there is no loss
of generlaity in making this assumption). The nice thing about such programs is that given
any annotated atom A : J.L, if CL(P) FA: J.l, then there is a single clause in P having a
ground instance of the form
A: P f- Body
such that P 1= Body and p ~ J.l. Thus, to show that P FA: J.l, we may look at those
clauses in P whose head's atomic part unifies with A and such that the annotation in the
head exzceeds J.L. However, the application of modus ponens requires that the annotations
match precisely. It is to facilitate this that we have the "weakening" rille described above.
In addition, for each JlP E T such that J.l ~ p, we have the inference rule (called "weaken-
ing" ):
Likewise, it is easy to demonstrate that the temporal programs and disjunctive programs
described in Section 3 of this paper can also be incorporated into this framework.
5 Discussion
Various kinds of logic programs based on nonclassical logics have been developed. There
are now, in particular, quantitative logic programs [39], annotated logic programs [9], three-
valued (and n-valued) general logic programs [15], and fuzzy logic programming languages,
e.g. PROLOG-ELF [24] and the FPROLOG language of Martin, Baldwin and Pilsworth
[28]. The investigations of the quantitative, annotated and fuzzy logic programming lan-
guages are motivated, at least in part, by the need for a rigorous semantics for treating
uncertainty in deductive databases.
If we look at logic programs of any of the kinds just mentioned for which a definition of
model has been previously provided we see that the structural characteristics of the class of
models of each of these programs are similar. For example, programs without negation have
least models in the setting of classical two-valued semantics with respect to any admissible
interpretation of their function symbols; in particular they have least Herbrand models.
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Similarly, general programs (with negation allowed) have least models with respect to any
interpretation of their function symbols in the three-valued semantics. To get even more
removed from the classical two-valued setting, consider the quantitative programs of van
Emden [39]. Here the underlying truth values are taken to be the interval of real numbers
from 0 to 1. As in the ordinary two-valued case we may view programs as operators from
interpretations to interpretations and attempt to characterize the models of the programs in
terms of their images under these operators. Van Emden sets up the semantics of the rules
being considered (which may be described as definite clauses with "attenuation" factors)
so that an interpretation I of the program is a model of it iff I is a pre-fixed point of the
operator Tp corresponding to the program P. (I is a pre-fixed point of Tp if Tp(I) ~ I.)
Then, by methods that of course specifically depend on the definition of Tp, Tp is shown
to be continuous. Once this is done, it can be seen that the class of pre-fixed points of Tp
(and fixed points) has many of the same structural properties that it has in the qualitative
classical two-valued case.
Guessarian [22] recalls various fixed point theorems in ordered structures and surveys via
examples, applications of these theorems in semantics and proof theory, logic programming,
and deductive databases. OUf aim in this paper has been to expand upon such treatments of
logic programming as Guessarian's and show that such theorems are applicable to describing
the semantics of logic programs. This semantics is very similar across all of the non-classical
logic programming notions that we are examining. In each case we have shown that the
semantics that have been provided by the authors of these languages can be obtained by,
first, specifying the set of underlying truth values that the logic is intended to have, and
second, by defining for each program in the language an operator mapping sets of formulas
to sets of formulas. This, we think, illuminates the underlying reasons that unify the similar
properties that one sees in the semantics associated with programs of various kinds based
upon nonclassical logics ..
6 Conclusions
The main aim of this paper has been to present a single uniform framework for studying
the semantics of logic programming based on different logics, as well as logic programming
with different extensions of classical paradigm. In this paper, we studied only those logics
that have a monotone consequence operator. We provided a concept of an abstract logic,
and define abstract logic programs in terms of abstract logics. We then derived various
results relating fixed-points of operators associated with programs with model-states of the
programs. We showed how various systems for paraconsistent logic programming, qllantita-
tive logic programming, temporal logic programming, disjunctive logic programming, and
distributed logic programming etc. may be captured in our framework. To our knowledge,
such a unifying semantical framework for non-classical logic programming and extensions
of logic programming had not previously been formulated.
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